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LONDON AND COUNTY BANK v. GROOME.
The rule of law applicable to overdue bills and notes does not apply to checks,
and therefore the mere fact that the holder receives a check eight days after date
does not render his title subject to any equities or matter attachiug to the check
which might amount to a defence as between the drawer and payee.
It is a question for the jury whether the check was taken under circumstances
which ought to have excited suspicion, and the fact that it was eight days overdue
is evidence in deciding the question.
J)own v. Halling, 4 B. & 0. 330, explained.

consideration.
This was an action to recover 981., the amount due upon a check
drawn by the defendant in favor of one Moss, or bearer, and
handed by him to one George Colls, who handed it, eight days
after date, to his bankers, the plaintiffs, for value.
The check being dishonored, the action was brought before
FIELD, J., and a special jury. A verdict for the full amount was
entered for the plaintiffs, and the learned judge reserved the case
for further consideration upon the question whether the plaintiffs
having taken the check eight days overdue took it at their peril
with all the equities attaching to it as between the defendant and
Colls. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
FURTHER

"atthews, Q. 0. (J. Paget with him), for the plaintiffs.
Bose Innes, for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FIELD, J.-This is an action brought to recover 981., the amount
of a check of which the plaintiffs were bearers. It was dated the
21st of August 1880, and it directed the National Bank to pay
that sum to A. Moss or bearer; and the statement of claim alleged
presentation for payment, non-payment, and due notice of dishonor.
The defendant by his statement of defence denied notice of dishonor,
and alleged that the defendant, on the 20th of August, handed the
check to George Colls under such circumstances as, if proved, and
if the latter had been the plaintiffs, might have furnished a good
answer to his claim. The statement of defence further alleged that
Colls, in fraud, delivered the check to the plaintiffs, who had notice
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of the premises. As a separate defence, the defendant further
alleged the same circumstances, and that the plaintiffs were the
agents of Colls, and had given no consideration, and held the same
subject to the equities existing between Colls and the defendant.
As a further defence, the defendant said that the check was presented for payment by Colls, and dishonored, and the plaintiffs, at
the expiration of eight days, took the same with notice and subject
to the equities. At the trial, the paintiffs proved that Colls was
a customer, having an account at one of their branches, and that
he had on the 29th of August (eight days after the date) paid in
the check to the credit of his account, and that they had given
him consideration for the same. The defendant cross-examined
the plaintiffs' witnesses, but did not elicit from them any circumstances tending t) show any notice or absence of bona ftides on the
plaintiffs' part, or anything which tended to show that the payment
of the check by Colls into his account was made under any circumstances which ought to have excited the suspicion of the plaintiffs, as reasonable men of business, that the check was at all tainted
with fl-aud, except the circumstance that the delivery to them was
made eight days after the date of the check.
The plaintiffs' counsel contented himself with proving a prima
facie case; and at the close of it Mr. Talfourd Salter said that
he had not affirmative evidence to prove any notice to the plaintiffs,
and did not wish to address the jury on the question as to the consideration given by the plaintiffs, or the presentation by Colls
alleged in the 5th paragraph ; but he submitted that, inasmuch
as the 5th pa-ragraph alleged that the plaintiffs had taken the check
eight days after its date, I was bound to rule that this circumstance
alone was sufficient to entitle him to the benefit of the well-established
rule of law as applicable to overdue bills of exchange and promissory notes, that those who take them take them at their peril, and
stand in no better position than those from whom they take them as
to any equities between the latter and the acceptor, or maker, attaching to the instrument; and for his authority on this point he cited
the case of Down v. tHa/ing. Mr. Jlattzews, for the plaintiffs,
denied the existence of any such rule of law, and relied upon the
case of Rotkseldld v. Corney. I, for the purposes of the day,
ruled against Mr. Salter, and directed a verdict for the plaintiffs,
reserving, however, for further consideration the question whether
the mere circumstance that the plaintiffs took the check eight days
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after its date was enough by itself, as a matter of law, to place the
plaintiffs in the position of takers at their peril, so as to entitle the
defendant to treat them as if they were in the position of Colls, and
liable to have their title to sue defeated by any matter attaching to
the check which would have amounted to an answer against Colls.
The case was afterwards argued before me on further consideration, when all the authorities on both sides were ably and fully
brought before me, and having considered them, I see no reason to
alter the view which I took at the trial. That the holder of an
overdue bill or note, payable at a fixed date of course appearing upon
it, is in the position suggested, is established beyond all doubt, and
the reason of the rule is that, inasmuch as these instruments are
usually current during the period before they become payable, and
their negotiation after that period is out of the usual and ordinary
course of dealing, that circumstance is sufficient of itself to excite
so much suspicion that, as a rule of law, the endorsee must take it
on the credit of, and can stand in no better position than, the
endorser: Brown v. Davies. But with regard to checks, no such
rule has been laid down, the case of Down v. Hailing, as I shall
show-presently, not amounting, I think, to any such decision, and
there is one case in which that proposition has been denied or
doubted.
In Rothschild v. corney, the action was brought by the maker
of the check to recover the amount from the defendants. The
check was dated the 19th of January. It had been obtained from
the plaintiffs by the fraud of Brady ; and Brady, on the 24th (five
(lays after date), handed, it to the defendants, who cashed it bona
fide, and afterwards presented it and received the amount from the
plaintiffs' bank. At the trial the learned judge directed the jury
that if they thought the circumstances of the case were such as
ought to have excited the suspicioli of a prudent man, and that the
defendants had not acted with reasonable caution, they should find a
verdict for the plaintiffs, otherwise for the defendants. A rule was
then obtained for a new trial, on the ground that the judge ought to
have directed the jury that the checks were overdue, and so the
defendants took them at their peril, and could have no better title
than Brady; but after argument, in which Down v. Hailing was
cited, the rule was discharged, Lord Chief Justice TENTERDEN
saying that it could not be laid down as a matter of law that a party
taking a check after any fixed time from its date must do so at his
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peril. Mr. Justice LITTLEDALE observed that, although the rule
of law was so as to bills of exchange and promissory notes, it could
not be applied to checks.
In Serrell v. Der.byshire Railway Corpanzy, the check was dated
the 13th of August, and was not presented until the 6th of October,
and the case of Down v. Halling was cited by Mr. Justice CiESSWELLL for the proposition of Mr. Justice HOLROYD in it that the
defendants having taken the check more than five days after date
took it at their peril, and Mr. Serjeant B/fies, arguendo, said that
Down v. Halling was not consistent with Roth,schiild v. Corney.
Mr. Justice MAULE held that no such strict law existed that a
check must, as against the maker under such circumstances, be presented promptly, but that when a reasonable time had passed a
check stands on the same footing as a bill of exchange, and holding the check in that particular case might probably be considered
in the nature of an overdue bill, and fraud being shown in its inception, the onus was thrown upon the plaintiff of showing how he
got it. Of course, even with regard to checks, there is no doubt
that in the ordinary course of business they are intended almost as
cash for'early, if not prompt, payment; and it is well-known law
that, as between the maker and payee, although there is no absolute duty to present a check promptly, that duty so much exists
that exact rules have been laid down beyond what period the payee
may not delay presentation if he wishes to avoid the consequences
of any damage caused to the maker by the insolvency of the drawee,
or other injuries falling upon his shoulders. Having regard to
this duty, I have come to the conclusion that, looking to the peculiar circumstances of Down v. Halling, and the mode in which the
matter was there treated, there is no such conflict between that case
and the case of Rothschild v. Corney, as has been supposed.
In Dowmn v. Halling, the plaintiff sought to recover the amount
of a check for 501., dated the 16th of November 1824; he did not
show how that check got out of his hands, but on the evening of
the 22d a woman unknown to the defendant bought at his shop
goods worth 51., and tendered the check in payment, he paying her
the difference; he presented the check on the following day and
received the amount. No evidence having been given by the plaintiff accounting for its having got out of his hands, the defendant
claimed a nonsuit on that ground; but Lord TENTEItDEN told the
jury to find for the plaintiff if they thought that the defendant
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had taken the check under circumstances which ought to have
excited the suspicion of a reasonable man; and further (on the authority of C-ill v. Ctubitt, 3 B. & 0. 466, which has since been
overruled) asked whether the defendant, although not acting fraudulently, had acted negligently in taking the check ; and upon those
directions the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff; and upon a
rule having been moved for a new trial on the ground of misdirection, the-court supported the direction as to negligence, upon the
authority of Gill v. Cubitt ; and as to the rule, Mr. Justice BAYLEY
is reported to have said, generally, that if a check is taken after it
is due, the party taking it can have no better title than the person
from whom he took it; and it is in this passage that he is supposed
to lay that proposition down as a rule of law. It must be remembered, however, that Lord TENTERD EN was also a party to the decision in Rothschild v. Corney, and could not have intended to hold
in that case contrarily to the so recent decision of Down v. talling;
and if the language of Mr. Justice IJOLROYD is looked at when he
says that five days ought to have excited the defendant's suspicion,
and that in the earlier case a reasonable time had elapsed, I think
the true result of that case is that the court decided it rather upon
its own peculiar facts than as intending to lay down any strict
rule of law.
In Serrell v. Derbyshire Railway Company, Mr. Justice MAULE
says perhaps the two cases may be reconciled ; and, if my view of
the character of the decision in Down v. Halling is right, I have
been able to come to the same conclusion:
I should, therefore, under ordinary circumstances, have contented
myself with giving judgment for the plaintiffs; but I think,
assuming this to be the true view of Down v. Halling, it follows,
from that case, as well as from the other cases, that the true question for the jury being whether the check in the present case was
taken by the plaintiffs under such circumstances as ought to have
excited their suspicion, and the lapse of eight days being a circumstance undoubtedly, though not conclusive, to be taken into consideration by them in considering that question, I ought to have left
that question to the jury. I should, indeed, have done so if I had
thought that Mr. Talfourd Salter had wished it. From what
passed, 'however, at the argument, I think there may have been some
misunderstanding on my part in the matter. It is undoubtedly
true that that question was not left to the jury ; and the defend-

